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CHECK-OUT TIME AT THE HOTEL
CALIFORNIA:1 "THE LAST RESORT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS '2 AND
PROPOSITION 187 CONSIDERED
The United States Constitution confers a number of powers ex-
clusively upon the federal government.3 The powers not granted to
the federal government are reserved to the states and the people
1 THE EAGLES, Hotel California, on HOTEL CALIFORNIA (Elektra/Asylum Records 1976).
2 Buck v. Bell, 200 U.S. 205, 208 (1927). Carrie Buck was a "feeble minded white
woman," the daughter of a feeble minded mother and herself the mother of an illegitimate
feeble minded child. Id. at 205. In an opinion holding that Carrie's state-ordered
sterilization did not offend either the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Holmes wrote, "It is the usual last resort of constitutional
arguments to point out shortcomings of this sort." Id. at 208.
That another of the most famous quotes in American law also comes from this same
opinion-a mere five paragraphs long-is a remarkable coincidence: "Three generations of
imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Section 8 of Article I provides:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common defence and general Welfare of the
United States... To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes;
To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard
of Weights and Measures;
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of
the United States;
To establish Post Offices and post roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful arts by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Of-
fenses against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for
a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States...
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not ex-
ceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States and the Acceptance
of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of United States, and to exercise like
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
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by the Tenth Amendment.4 This state authority, known as
"police power,"5 while tremendously broad,' is nevertheless cir-
cumscribed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.7
Control over education administration is one of a state's most
important exercises of its police powers.8 Friction between the
Constitution and the states' sovereign prerogatives to formulate
education policy has given rise to some of this century's most sig-
which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards
and other needful Buildings; AndTo make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Executionthe foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. X. ("The powers not designated to the United States by the Consti-tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
5 See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 8.2, at 277 (4th ed.1991) (providing overview of "police power").6 See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 370 (Consol. 1995) (regulating building codes); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 13141 (West 1995) (regulating pesticide use); Ky. RV. STAT. ANN.§ 228.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1995) (regulating dry cleaners); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch.
119, § 1 (West 1993) (regulating child welfare); L. REV. STAT. ch. 410 para. 650.001(Smith-Hurd 1993) (regulating food preparation in public eating facilities); GA. CODE AN.
§ 68-101 (Harrison 1991) (regulating motor vehicle operation and licensing); HAW. REV.STAT. § 143-1 (1985) (regulating dog licensing); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 1995) (reg-ulating education).
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, orproperty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction theequal protection of the laws.
Id.s See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (limiting state's ability to compel
school attendance of Amish children while recognizing validity of compulsory attendance
statutes generally); see also NEWTON EDWARDS, THf COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 12,19, 74 (1955) (disCUSSing Court's recognition of valid compulsory school attendance policy);JOSH C. HOA98, THe SCHOOlS, ThE CoURirS, AND TAL PUBLIC INTEREST 168 (1985) (discuss-
ing Court's recognition of valid compulsory school attendance policy).
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nificant Supreme Court decisions. 9 Today, education is again at
the center of a constitutional controversy: Proposition 187.10
Proposition 187 represents California's attempt to lighten the
fiscal burden brought on by its undocumented alien population.11
While illegal immigration is, by constitutional definition, a na-
tional problem,' 2 California leads a short list of states that receive
a dramatically disproportionate share of this country's illegal im-
migrants.13 One of Proposition 187's most conspicuous measures
denies the children of illegal aliens access to the state's system of
free public education. 4 An obstacle to this scheme is Plyler v.
9 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (invalidating
'separate but equal" doctrine of school segregation as unconstitutional); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding Oregon statute prohibiting private education
violated Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
402 (1923) (holding State law prohibiting teaching of foreign languages to children below
eighth grade unconstitutional). For more recent education cases involving major Supreme
Court decisions, see, e.g., Acton v. Veronia School Dist., 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2396 (1995) (hold-
ing drug testing of high school students absent reasonable suspicion did not violate Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches); Regents of Univ. of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 296 n.36 (1978) (upholding ability of state to consider race of appli-
cants in affirmative action program for admission to state university medical school);
Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding school ban on armbands
worn by high school students in protest of Vietnam War violated students' First Amend-
ment rights of free speech). See generally EDWARDS, supra note 8 (discussing significant
issues in education law); HOGAN, supra note 8 (same); LAWRENCE KOTN & WILLiAM F. AI-
MAN, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE (1980) (focusing on history
and significance of compulsory school attendance in American law); ROSEMARY C. SALO-
MONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW (1986) (considering federal policy issues of discrimi-
nation in education on bases of race, gender, language and handicap).
10 See League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Wilson, 908 F.Supp. 755,
763 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding portions of Proposition 187 preempted by federal law).
11 See Proposition 187, § 1. "The People of California ... have suffered and are suffering
economic hardship caused by the presence of illegal aliens in this state [and] have suffered
and are suffering personal injury and damage caused by the criminal conduct of illegal
aliens in this state." Id.
12 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power .... To establish a uni-
form Rule of Naturalization . .. ."); see also DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976)
(holding that although power to regulate immigration is exclusively federal, California
statute that made knowing employment of illegal aliens unlawful was not precluded by
federal law).
13 See William Branigin, Sharing Immigration's Burden; Fund Would Reimburse States
for Illegal Aliens' Emergency Medical Care, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1995, at A15 (noting that
California, New York, Texas, Florida and Illinois are to be beneficiaries of proposed $3.5
billion trust fund); Philip Dine, Silent Guests; Little Noticed, Illegal Immigrants are Grow-
ing Presence Here, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Oct. 15, 1995, at 1B (acknowledging Califor-
nia, Texas and Florida as leaders in illegal immigration, but noting estimated 6,000 un-
documented Mexican aliens in St. Louis); Steven A. Holmes, Large Increase in Deportations
Occurred in '95, N.Y. TmsES, Dec. 28, 1995, at Al (citing number of 1995 deportations,
51,600, was 15% increase from 1994 and 75% increase from 1990); Diane Targovnik, INS
Nabs Budget Hike for Agents; Texas may receive 681 New Personnel, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb.
9, 1996, at A12 (noting INS plans to assign 1,260 new personnel to California and addi-
tional 681 new personnel to Texas).
14 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (West 1995). Section seven of Proposition 187 amended Cal-
ifornia's Education Code to prohibit any public elementary or secondary school to admit or
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Doe, 5 the controversial 1982 United States Supreme Court deci-
sion which held a similar measure violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Much of the controversy
surrounding Plyler turned on the Court's departure from tradi-
tional equal protection evaluation.' 6
This note proposes a number of ideas. First, that "fundamental
rights" is a flawed basis for equal protection analysis. A more
sound model looks to the existence of a "protection of the laws."
The state creates a protection of the laws when it coerces individu-
als to act for the protection of society.' 7 An entitlement, on the
other hand, is offered to, not forced upon, the individual. Put sim-
ply, when the state says, "you must," it creates a protection of the
laws; when the state says, "you may," it offers an entitlement.
Unlike a protection of the laws, to refuse an entitlement brings
about no legal sanction. One must qualify for an entitlement.18
permit the attendance of any child not lawfully present in the U.S. Id. § 42815(a). The
statute called for each school district, beginning January 1, 1995, to verify the legal status
of each child enrolling for the first time. Id. § 42815(b). By January 1, 1996, each district
was to establish the lawful residency of each student currently attending public elementary
or secondary schools. Id. § 42815(c). Children determined or reasonably suspected of un-
lawful presence would be allowed to continue to attend school for ninety days from the date
of notification. Id. § 42815(e),(f). Furthermore, any child determined or reasonably sus-
pected of unlawful presence in the U.S. is reported to the U.S. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) and the Attorney General of California. Id. § 48215(e). In addition to the
provisions of the other sections of Proposition 187, subsection (d) of California's Education
Code provides that: "By January 1, 1996, each school district shall also have verified the
legal status of each parent or guardian of each child... ." Id. § 42815(d). Determination or
reasonable suspicion of a parent's unlawful status would result in the child's removal from
school within ninety days unless legal status were established. Id. § 42815(e).
15 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
16 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-18. The Court explained that where fundamental rights or
suspect classifications were involved, equal protection analysis required that the chal-
lenged legislation be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." Id. at
216-217. The Court then noted that on occasion, legislation, without being facially invidi-
ous, as with suspect classes or fundamental rights, "[gave] rise to recurring constitutional
difficulties." Id. at 217. In those "limited circumstances," a five-justice majority of the Court
felt that such legislation required that the legislation would call for an "intermediate" level
of scrutiny. Id. at 217-18.
17 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 271 (Encyl. Britannica 1952) (1859). Mill
stated that the object of his essay, On Liberty, was
to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of
society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means
used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public
opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individ-
ually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is
self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilised comunity, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Id.
18 See BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 532 (6th ed. 1990). "Entitle" is defined as: "To qualify for,
to furnish with proper grounds for seeking or claiming." Id. But see Judith Lichtenberg,
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By definition some people will not be eligible. The Fourteenth
Amendment makes clear, however, that no person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws. 19
The United States Supreme Court has held that a state is under
no affirmative duty to protect its residents.2 ° The protection/enti-
tlement distinction is entirely consonant with this view. The state
need not offer protective services, financial relief or other benefits
to its residents. The state cannot, however, create or enforce laws
that protect one class of persons while denying that protection to
another class.
These themes will be explored below. Part One of this Note will
detail the measures of Proposition 187. Part Two examines police
powers, the source of California's jurisdiction to enact such laws.
Part Three of the Note synthesizes a number of cases denying the
existence of a state's affirmative duty to protect its residents. Bor-
rowing elements of the Supreme Court's due process analysis, a
construct based on the protection/entitlement distinction will be
proposed. To whom both protections and entitlements must be ex-
tended will be demonstrated. A review of the Court's rationale in
Plyler suggests that its method was flawed and that the protec-
tion/entitlement model would yield a clearer result. Finally, Part
Four applies the model to Proposition 187 concluding that some,
although not all, of its measures are unconstitutional.
I. PROPOSITION 187 AND THE ILLEGAL ALIEN PROBLEM
Both in California and nation-wide, estimates of the size of the
illegal immigrant population vary by as much as 100 percent. 21
Within the Pale: Aliens, Illegal Aliens and Equal Protection, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 351, 364
(1983) (employing "entitlement" in different construction).
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State... deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
20 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 187, 200 (1989) (holding state had no
duty to protect four-year-old child ultimately brain damaged when released into care of
abusive father, even though state authorities had knowledge of father's violent history).21 See Richard Sybert, Population, Immigration and Growth in California, 31 SAN DIGo
L. REv. 945 (1994). The author, the former Director of Planning and Research for the State
of California, admits that no reliable figures for illegal immigration are available. Id. at
967. Census Bureau figures estimate 4 million illegal immigrants nationwide with approxi-
mately 2 million in California. Id. at 964. The author attributes another figure of 1.3 mil-
lion illegal immigrants in California to the Demographic Research Unit of the California
Department of Finance. Id. He later notes that Los Angeles accounts for more than half of
California's illegal alien population with more than 700,000 (and growing by 66,000 a
year). Id. at 976. [Note: However, allowing 750,000 in Los Angeles, and by extension 1.5
million in California, the national illegal alien population, reputed to be double that of
1995]
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Accepting even the lowest figures, it is clear that California is
home to a substantial number of illegal aliens.22 Notwithstanding
the uncertain population figures, California's costs23 to provide
services to these undocumented aliens are, by nearly any mea-
sure, formidable.24
California, would be only three million.] Compare, Mark Curriden, No More Open Door,
ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Nov. 21, 1994, at H1 (citing federal estimate of 4 million illegal
aliens nationally) with Joseph G. Nalven, The Illegal Alien Numbers Game, SAN DiEGo
UNION-Thin., Dec. 9, 1993, at B15 (exposing disparity of estimates for California's illegal
alien population ranging from 2.3 million to 4 million; nationwide estimates range from 4.7
million to 8 million).
22 See Sybert, supra note 21, at 964 (citing figure of 1.3 million illegal aliens in
California).
23 See, e.g., Anti-immigration Folly Initiative Would Crack Down on Schoolchildren, SAN
DiNGo UNION-TRm., June 19, 1994, at G2 [hereinafter Anti-immigration Folly] (citing esti-
mates of 375,000 illegal alien students in kindergarten through 12th grade at cost to Cali-
fornia of $2 billion annually); George J. Borjas, Know the Flow; Economics of Immigration,
NAT'L REv., Apr. 17, 1995, at 44 (quoting estimate of $1.7 billion to educate children of
illegal aliens in California); Tony Perry, Gingrich Offers To Fully Repay States on Immi-
grant Care, L.A. TImEs, Oct. 21, 1995, at Al (quoting California Governor Pete Wilson's
estimate for fiscal year 1995-96 of $382 million for emergency medical services to illegal
immigrants, up from $21 million in 1988-89); Angelica Quiroga, Copycat Fever; Proposal to
Ban Social Services for Illegal Immigrants, HisPmc, Apr. 1995, at 18 (citing increase of
illegal alien health service costs in California from $22 million in 1989, to $400 million in
1995); Dan Walters, Proposition 187 Decision Ironic, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 23, 1995, at
A3 (citing estimate of illegal alien cost to California of $3 billion); Nalven, supra note 21
(quoting estimates of illegal alien cost to San Diego County ranging from $145 million to
$244 million).
Other data suggest that the costs of services to aliens are more than offset by their tax
contributions. See, e.g., Note, Unenforced Boundaries: Illegal Immigration and the Limits
of Judicial Federalism, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1643, 1645 (1995). Costs of providing illegal
aliens with state medicaid ($395 million); primary education ($1.6 billion); and incarcera-
tion of adult felons ($360 million) equal a total cost to the State of California of approxi-
mately $2.35 billion. Id. The same source of these figures, the Government Accounting Of-
fice (GAO) also calculated the annual tax revenue generated by these aliens at $2.4 billion,
roughly equal to California's costs to provide them services. Id. The distribution of these
revenues, however, appears less than equitable, with $1.1 billion going to the State, but
$1.3 billion to the federal government. Id. at 1646.
24 Yet, paradoxically, in another of California's "alien" cultures, Hollywood, some of
these figures seem perhaps less formidable. See Judy Brennan, Troubled Route to Pirate
Epic "Cutthroat," L.A. Tms, Dec. 21, 1995, at Fl. Two motion pictures released in 1995,
"Waterworld" and "Cutthroat Island," were produced at costs estimated at $172 million-
$235 million and $90 million-$120 million, respectively. Id; see also, Josh Young, Glug,
Glug; "Waterworld" and the Movie Industry's Media Manipulation, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 14,
1995, at 10 (reporting estimated cost of "Waterworld at $175 million-$200 million).
These two movies, however, are merely drops in a leaking bucket of Hollywood cash. See,
e.g., Michael Hirsch, et al., Goodbye, Mickey, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 18, 1995, at 55 (noting down-
fall of Sony executive Mickey Schulhof largely as result of $3.2 billion write-off of Sony's
Hollywood assets); Gregg Kilday et al., Cents and Sensibility, ENT. WEEKLY, Dec. 22, 1995,
at 22 (citing Sony's buyout of producers Jon Peters's and Peter Guber's Warner Bros. con-
tract for $500 million; five years later Guber's severance package was reported $20 million
plus $200 million production company).
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The Proposition 187 referendum passed in California with 59
percent of the vote in favor of the initiative.25 Section One of Prop-
osition 187 justifies the measures of the initiative by noting the
damage caused to the people of California by illegal aliens.26 In
order to avert further injury, California voted to deny the follow-
ing to illegal aliens: elementary and secondary education;27 post-
secondary education;28 social services; 29 and publicly-funded non-
25 See Paul Feldman and Patrick J. McDonnell, Judge Holds Off Ruling On Legality of
Prop. 187, L.A. TrsaS, Oct. 24, 1995, at A3 (noting margin of iniative's passage).
Some interesting sub-text is found in the margins of the Proposition 187 story. See, e.g.,
H.R. 1170, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The bill, passed in the House of Representatives
would require a three-judge panel to grant injunction against execution of a state law
passed by referendum. See also Stephen Green, House OK's Bill Halting One-Judge Refer-
endum Rulings, SAN DiEGo UNION-TRm., Sept. 29, 1995, at A3. The United States House of
Representatives passed a bill to prohibit blockage of ballot initiatives by injunctions issued
by a single federal judge. Id. The bill, approved 266-159, represented the "maiden legisla-
tive effort" of Rep. Sonny Bono. Id. The bill would require any injunction against enforce-
ment of a voter-approved initiative be ordered by a three-judge panel. Id. The normal mode
of review for over 60 years, Congress abolished three-judge courts (except for reapportion-
ment cases) in 1972 in an effort to clear federal case backlogs. Id.
Of additional interest is the reported public opinion about Proposition 187 and other
immigration issues as broken down along ethnic lines. See, e.g., Tom Tancredo, Make a
Candidate Sweat -Ask About Illegal Aliens, DENY. PosT, Apr. 30, 1995, at El. The author
cites figures claiming 43% of Hispanic voters voted in favor of Proposition 187. Id; see also
Anti-immigration Folly, supra note 23, at G2. Blacks and latinos are said to have opposed
Proposition 187 by differing margins. Id.; Sybert, supra note 21, at 995-97. The author cites
numerous poll data from 1993 that reflect popular opinion of immigration issues. Id.
26 Proposition 187, § 1. "The People of California . . . have suffered and are suffering
economic hardship caused by the presence of illegal aliens in this state [and] have suffered
and are suffering personal injury and damage caused by the criminal conduct of illegal
aliens in this state." Id.
27 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (West 1995). Section seven of Proposition 187 amended Cal-
ifornia's Education Code to prohibit any public elementary or secondary school to admit or
permit the attendance of any child not lawfully present in the U.S. Id. § 42815(a). The
statute called for each school district, beginning January 1, 1995, to verify the legal status
of each child enrolling for the first time. Id. § 42815(b). By January 1, 1996, each district
was to establish the lawful residency of each student currently attending public elementary
or secondary schools. Id. § 42815(c). Children determined or reasonably suspected tf un-
lawful presence would be allowed to continue to attend school for ninety days from the date
of notification. Id. § 42815(e)(f). Furthermore, any child determined or reasonably sus-
pected of unlawful presence in the U.S. is reported to the U.S. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) and the Attorney General of California. Id. § 48215(e). In addition to the
provisions of the other sections of Proposition 187, subsection (d) of California's Education
Code provides that: "By January 1, 1996, each school district shall also have verified the
legal status of each parent or guardian of each child ... ." Id. § 42815(d). Determination or
reasonable suspicion of a parent's unlawful status would result in the child's removal from
school within ninety days unless legal status was established. Id. § 42815(e).
28 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66010.8 (West 1995). Section eight of Proposition 187 added
§ 66010.8 to the California Education Code, prohibiting any public institution of postsecon-
dary education from admitting, enrolling or permitting the attendance of any person un-
lawfully in the United States. Id. § 66010.8(a). As with the other measures of Proposition
187, § 66010.8 also provides for INS and Attorney General notification. Id. § 66010.8(c).
29 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (West 1995). Section five of Proposition 187 added
to the California Welfare and Institutions Code to deny "the benefits of public social serv-
ices" to aliens unable to establish their lawful presence in the U.S. Id. § 10001.5(a)(b). As
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emergency medical care."° In addition, Proposition 187 requires
that state service providers to notify the United States Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service ("INS") of anyone seeking the pro-
hibited services who is reasonably suspected of unlawful presence
in this country. 1
Proposition 187's reach is not limited to illegal aliens.32 For ex-
ample, not only must children seeking public education verify
their own lawful presence in the United States,33 but their par-
ents must further demonstrate their own legal residency. 34 Every
child born in this country, regardless of the alienage of her par-
ents, is a United States citizen.35 In Los Angeles County alone
there are an estimated 250,000 citizen children born to illegal
with other Sections of Proposition 187, the alien's status is reported to the INS and the
California Attorney General upon a determination, or reasonable suspicion, of the alien's
illegal presence in California. Id. § 10001.5(c)(1-3).
30 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ch. 1.3, § 130 (West 1995). Section six of Proposition 187
amended the California Health and Safety Code to extend non-emergency publicly-funded
health care only to citizens of the United States and lawfully admitted aliens. Id. § 130(a)
(b). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(b) A person shall not receive any health care services from a publicly-funded health
care facility, to which he or she is otherwise entitled until the legal status of that per-
son has been verified as one of the following:
(1) A citizen of the United States.
(2) An alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident.
(3) An alien lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time.
Id. Furthermore, as with other sections of Proposition 187, any person determined or rea-
sonably suspected of unlawful presence in the U.S. is: (1) denied services; (2) notified of his
or her illegal status; (3) reported to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and
the Attorney General of California. Id. § 130(c) (1-3).
31 CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48215, 66010.8 (West 1995) (requiring INS notification); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (West 1995) (same); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ch. 1.3,
§ 130 (West 1995) (same).
32 GAL. EDTiC. CODE § 48215 (West 1995) (requiring proof of parents' legal residence be-
yond legal resident status of child).
33 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (b)(c) (West 1995) (requiring proof of legal residence for cur-
rent students as well as students enrolling for first time).
34 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (d)(West 1995) (requring proof of parents' legal residence).
35 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.").
The certainty of this statement is somewhat less secure today as Congress considers a
constitutional amendment to end automatic citizenship for any child born in the U.S. See
Gil Klein, What Makes a Citizen of the U.S.?, TAMPA Tam., Dec. 30, 1995, at 6 (citing Gen-
eral Accounting office estimate of $479 million paid in welfare benefits to citizen children of
illegal immigrants in 1992); Neil A. Lewis, Bill Seeks to End Automatic Citizenship for All
Born in the U.S., N.Y. Tnsms, Dec. 14, 1995, at A26 (noting that not only Republicans, but
also some Democrats in Congress, especially those from California, have shown support for
measure); Joan Lowy, A U.S. Birthright Under Scrutiny, RocKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 23,
1995, at 3A (citing California Dept. of Health Services estimates of 96,000 babies born to
illegal immigrants in 1992 with medical costs to state of $230 million).
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alien parents.3 6 Section six of Proposition 187, which prohibits ex-
tending non-emergency medical care to illegal aliens,37 creates a
de facto denial of services to these same citizen children. Faced
with discovery and deportation, the illegal alien parent of an
American citizen child has a decided disincentive to seek medical
care for an ill child.38
Proposition 187 is currently wending its way toward an ex-
pected review by the United States Supreme Court.39 Judge Mari-
ana R. Pfaelzer4 ° of the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California has already granted partial summary
judgment in an early assault on Proposition 187,41 finding several
measures of Proposition 187 preempted by federal law.42
Of the various elements of Proposition 187, this Note will focus
on restrictions affecting primary and secondary education. Before
addressing the constitutionality of denying children access to pub-
lic education, one first must determine whether public education
is an entitlement or a protection of the laws. As discussed below,
36 See Robert B. Gunnison, Wilson Gains Support On Funds for Immigrants, S.F.
CHRoN., Feb. 1, 1993, at Al (commenting on reach of Proposition 187 beyond illegal aliens).
37 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ch. 1.3, § 130 (West 1995) The statute provides in perti-
nent part:
(b) A person shall not receive any health care services from a publicly-funded health
care facility, to which he or she is otherwise entitled until the legal status of that per-
son has been verified as one of the following:
(1) A citizen of the United States.
(2) An alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident.
(3) An alien lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time.
Id.
38 See, e.g., Paul Feldman, Lawyers Weigh Options in Prop. 187 Battle, L.A. TrAEs, Nov.
22, 1995, at A3 (attributing 40% decline in women seeking prenatal care in clinic where
half of 1400 annual births are to undocumented parents, even before enactment of law);
Quiroga, supra note 23, at 18 (noting chilling effect of Proposition 187 on undocumented
aliens in need of medical care for children).
39 See Paul Feldman, Judge Hints That Prop. 187 May Be Unconstitutional, LA. Tmms,
July 27, 1995, at A3 (noting expectations that Supreme Court review is likely); Paul Feld-
man & Patrick J. McDonnell, Judge Holds Off Ruling On Legality of Prop. 187, L.A. TIEs,
Oct. 24, 1995, at A3 (same).
40 Judge Pfaelzer is no stranger to high-profile cases. See Paul Feldman, Prop. 187 Rul-
ing Frustrating for Voters, L.A. Tmmxs, Nov. 22, 1995, at Al. President Jimmy Carter ap-
pointed Judge Pfaelzer to the federal bench in 1978, making her the first female federal
trial judge in California history. Id. Since that time she has sentenced Charles H. Keating
for his role in the Lincoln Savings & Loan scandal. Id. She also sentenced notorious com-
puter outlaw Kevin Mitnick to a rehab center for his "addiction" to computer hacking. Id. In
addition, it was Judge Pfaelzer who ordered a freeze on the worldwide assets of exiled
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos. Id.
41 League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 776
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding §§ 4-9 of Proposition 187 preempted by Congressional power to
regulate immigration, while §§ 2,3 were not preempted).
42 Id.
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the United States Supreme Court has ruled that there is not a
fundamental right to an education,43 yet every state has some sort
of compulsory school attendance law.4 4 Limiting the reach of com-
pulsory school attendance laws, therefore, raises the question of
whether a state can exclude an entire class of persons from receiv-
ing the protective benefits of public education without running
afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 An examination of the
source of the state's authority to administer its own education pol-
icy may provide some answers.
II. STATES' RIGHTS AND POLICE POWERS
The Tenth Amendment vests in the states and the people those
powers not delegated to the federal government by the Constitu-
tion.46 Police powers exist to enable the state to restrict the free-
doms of individuals for the protection of society as a whole.4 v
43 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding Texas'
state public school financing scheme did not violate Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment).
44 See ALA. CODE § 16-28-3 (1995); ALAsKA STAT. § 14.30.010 (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15-802 (1991); ARK CODE ANN. § 6-18-201 (Michie 1993); CAL EDUC. CODE § 48200
(Deering 1987); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-104 (1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-184
(1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2702 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-402 (1993); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 232.01 (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 32-21 (Harrison 1987); HAw. REV. STAT. § 298-
9 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 33-202 (1995); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, para. 26-1 (Smith-Hurd
1993); IND. CODE § 20-8.1-3-17 (Burns 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 299.1 (West 1988); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 72-111 (1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-221 (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5001-A (West 1993);
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-301 (1992); MASs. GEN. L. ch. 76, § 1 (Law Co-op. 1991); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 15-41561 (Callaghan 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (West 1993); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 37-13-91 (1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.031 (Vernon 1991); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 20-5-102 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-201 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.040 (Michie
1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.1-a (1989); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (West
1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-12-1 (Michie 1992); N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3205 (Consol. 1985);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-01 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3321.03 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 105 (West 1989); OR. REV.
STAT. § 339.010 (1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327 (1992); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 18, § 2
(1994); R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-19-1 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-10 (Law Co-op. 1990); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 13-27-1 (1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3005 (1990); TEx. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 21.032 (West 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-101 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
16, § 1121 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. §22.1-254 (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 28A.27.010 (West 1982); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (West
1991); Wyo. STAT. § 21-4-101 (1995).
45 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Nlor shall any State ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
46 U.S. CONsT. amend. XK ("The powers not designated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.")
47 See BLAcsS LAw DIcTIONARY 1156 (6th ed. 1990) Police power is defined as: "[tihe
power of the State to place restraints on the personal freedom and property rights of per-
sons for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the promotion of the
public convenience and general prosperity." Id.
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Although the term "police power" is not specifically mentioned in
the Constitution, the concept was first recognized 48 in Gibbons v.
Ogden.49 In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged the
states' authority to legislate any activities not controlled by the
federal government.5 0 Today, the breadth of the states' police
power seems at times to be almost limitless. 51
A. Parens Patriae
The state has even broader authority under its police power
where the interests of children are concerned. 52 The concept of
parens patriae53 predates the Fourteenth Amendment by centu-
See also Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 139 (1837). Ironically, Miln
was a case involving an anti-immigration statute passed by New York in 1824 "with a view
to prevent her citizens from being oppressed by the .... evil of thousands of foreign
emigrants.., and the consequent danger of her citizens being subjected to a heavy charge
in the maintenance of those who are poor." Id. at 141. Among other things, the statute
provided that ship masters could be required to post surety bonds of up to $300 for each
non-citizen passenger. Id. at 154. It required that persons "deemed likely to become charge-
able to the city," were to be removed to their places of last settlement at the expense of the
ship master or owner. Id. Furthermore, the statute imposed a penalty of $100 for any per-
son entering New York City with the intention of residing there who failed to make a report
to the proper authorities. Id. Miln came about as the result of a ship master failing to make
a report of the passengers on board within twenty-four hours of arriving at the port of New
York. Id. at 131.
Unlike challenges facing Proposition 187, the focus of Miln was whether New York's stat-
ute was an impermissible interference with the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. Id. at 145. What makes the case interesting is the Court's recognition of the
breadth of the states' police powers. Even Justice Story, who thought the statute violated
the Commerce Clause, acknowledged in his dissent the near-absolute powers of the states,
limited only by constitutional boundaries. Id. at 156 (Story, J., dissenting).
48 See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 277 (providing overview of origin of police
powers).
49 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
50 Id. at 198-99, 210-11.
51 See, e.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 370 (Consol. 1995) (regulating building codes); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13141 (West 1995) (regulating pesticide use); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 228.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1995) (regulating dry cleaners); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 119, § 1 (West 1993) (regulating child welfare); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 410 para.
650.001 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (regulating food preparation in public eating facilities); GA.
CODE ANN. § 68-101 (Harrison 1991) (regulating motor vehicle operation and licensing);
HAw. REv. STAT. § 143-1 (1985) (regulating dog licensing); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West
1995) (regulating education); see also Michael J. Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Ac-
tivisim, and the Intellectual Agenda of the Constitutional Theory: Reflections On, and Be-
yond, Plyer v. Doe, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 329, 340 (1983) (noting examples of states' police
power to illustrate classification in context of rational relation principle).
52 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (holding state prohibition on
minors selling newspapers or merchandise not violative of Fourteenth Amendment, even
where appellant child and parent were distributing religious literature); accord Ginsberg v.
State of New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1968) (upholding New York law prohibiting sale
of obscene matter to minors).
53 See BLAcies LAw DIcTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). Literally, "parent of the country."
Id. "It is the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of them-
selves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents." Id.
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ries.54 Exactly when the term first appeared in English law is
somewhat unclear.5 5 Under this doctrine, the care of "charities,
infants, idiots and lunatics" was undertaken by the Crown as par-
ent of the state.56 United States jurisprudence adopted parens pa-
triae following the American Revolution.57 As early as 1819, the
principle was considered so well-established that Chief Justice
Marshall considered listing the bases of its authority to be a
"waste of time."58
The role of parens patriae in the exercise of police powers by a
state is manifested in legislation protecting the health and wel-
fare of children.59 Compulsory school attendance laws are exam-
ples of this type of regulation.6 ° It is urged that this protection,
created under color of state law, rather than any fundamental
54 See, e.g., Late Corp. of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1889)
(tracing concept back to Pandects of Justinian).
55 See, e.g., Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the
State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887, 898 (1975). Professor
Areen cites the first appearance of the term in Falkland v. Bertie, 23 Eng. Rep. 814 (Ch.
1696). Id.; see also George Rossman, Parens Patriae, 4 OR. L. REv. 233, 236-37 (1925). Lord
Reddesdale, in Wellesley v. Wellesley, 2 Bligh, N.S. 218, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078 (1810), acknowl-
edged the sovereign duty ofparens patriae as having been recognized for "150 years past."
Id. [Note: Wellsley would date the origin back to 1660. The 1660 date is also consistent with
the history ofparenspatriae as reviewed in Ex Parte Daedler, 229 P. 467 (Cal. 1924) quoted
in Rossman, supra, at 237.] But see Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Executors, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1,
48 (1819). In Baptist Ass'n, Chief Justice Marshall asked whether charitable trusts could
be established "enforcing the prerogative of the King as parens patriae before the 43 [sic]
Elizabeth?" Id. at 43. The regnal year for the Statute of 43d Elizabeth was 1601. This
would suggest the term parens patriae was in use nearly a century before Falkland v. Ber-
tie in 1696. Furthermore, while conceding that the Statute of 43d Elizabeth was not techni-
cally operative, Justice McLean noted in 1854 that the principles were nonetheless
followed.
See Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 386 (1854) (discussing doctrine of parens
patriae with respect to charities).
56 See Baptist Ass'n, 17 U.S. at 13 (providing history of parens patriae); Latter Day
Saints, 136 U.S. at 56-58 (same): see also Areen, supra note 55, at 898, citing Falkland, 23
Eng. Rep. at 818 (same); Rossman, supra note 55, at 238, quoting Daedler, 229 P. at 467
(same).
57 See 2 Wn.LLm BLACKSTONE, COMENTARMES 1175 n.1 (Thos. Cooley 4th ed.) (discuss-
ing parental rights and duties); see also Fontain, 58 U.S. at 384. "The State, as a sovereign,
is the parens patriae." Id; Latter Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 57. "This prerogative of parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every state... exercised.., for the prevention
of injury to those who cannot protect themselves." Id.; THEODORE J. STEIN, CHILD WELFARE
AND THE LAw 27 (1991). The author cites parens patriae as the historical authority for the
state to remove a child from the home. Id. The first American case to acknowledge the state
authority to remove children from the home was Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Wheat (Pa.) 9 (1839).
Id. at 27.
58 Latter Day Saints, 136 U.S. at n.5. "Instances... in which the Legislature clearly acts
as parens patriae, may be found almost without number." Id.
59 See BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY supra note 53, at 1114 (defining parens patriae).
60 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (recognizing authority of state
as parens patriae, but limiting authority of state to determine religious future of children
through enforcement of compulsory school attendance statute).
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right, is what brings education within the scope of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
B. Compulsory School Attendance & The Protection of the Laws
Educating children has been called "the highest exercise of the
police power of the state."6 1 Although education policy is adminis-
tered solely by the states, it must nonetheless conform to federal
requirements concerning state action.62 Some 50,000 court cases
affecting the organization, administration and programs of Ameri-
can schools were decided between 1789 and 1984.63 The validity of
compulsory school attendance as an exercise of state police power
has never been questioned by the courts.64
In The Philosophy of Right,65 Hegel recognized that the "faddish
dislike[s]" of parents were a threat to society's prevailing interest
in the education of all its children.6 Consistent with the principle
of parens patriae, education has historically been considered so
important in this country that every state has enacted compulsory
school attendance laws.67 These laws have been justified as valid
exercises of the state's police power to ensure not only that chil-
dren are protected from the hazards of ignorance, but that society
as a whole is protected from the burden of an illiterate underclass
of individuals.68 The first compulsory school attendance law in Co-
lonial America was enacted by the Massachusetts Bay Colony in
61 Leeper v. State, 53 S.W. 962, 968 (1899) (holding Tennessee statute providing for uni-
form textbooks in public schools not unconstitutional monopoly).
62 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958) (holding Arkansas forced to integrate its
schools without delay); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) ("Determination by
the Legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive
but is subject to supervision by the courts.").
63 See HOGAN, supra note 8, at 10. The total number of estimated cases breaks down as
follows: 45,470 state court cases and 6,697 federal court cases, for a total of 52,167. Id.
6 JomN FREDERICK BENDER, FUNCTIONS OF THE COURTS IN ENFORCING SCHOOL ATTEND-
ANcE LAwS 95 (1927) (noting treatment of compulsory school attendance laws by courts).
65 G. W. F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (ADDrIIONS) $ 147 (T.M. Knox trans., En-
cycl. Britannica 1952) (1821) (discussing rights and responsibilities of parents).
66 Id.; see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (noting that parental responsibility to see their
children are educated is considered so important that education is made compulsory by
law).
67 See KOriN & AuN, supra note 9, at 74. Note, however, that the authors provide no
such statute for Mississippi. Mississippi's compulsory school attendance statute became
effective July 1, 1987; the authors' book was published in 1980. Id.; see also supra note 44.
This footnote lists the compulsory school attendance statutes for the 50 states, District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico. Id.
68 See Fogg v. Board of Educ., 82 Atl. 173, 175 (N.H. 1912) In Fogg, the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire held: "While most people regard the public schools as the means of great
personal advantage to the pupils, the fact is too often overlooked that they are governmen-
tal means of protecting the state from the consequences of an ignorant and incompetent
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1642.69 The first such law in the United States, also in Massachu-
setts, was enacted in 1852.70 Today, of the fifty states, the District
of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, each has a compulsory school at-
tendance law.7 '
Ironically, some of the most significant Supreme Court cases
recognizing the state's authority to compel school attendance in-
volved limitations on that authority. The constitutional issue in
Meyer v. Nebraska7 2 concerned a due process challenge based on
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests.7 3 Nebraska had enacted
a statute in 1919 which forbade the teaching of any language
other than English to children in any school below the eighth
grade. 74 A parochial school teacher was arrested for teaching Ger-
man to a ten year-old. 7- The Court in Meyer expressly recognized
the ability of the state to develop its own curriculum, including the
citizenship." Id; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). This case noted the
special importance of education to American people. Id.
Another case examining the importance of compulsory school attendance was New York
v. Chelsea Jute Mills, 43 Misc. Rep. 266, 88 N.Y.S. 1085 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. N.Y. County
1904). Chelsea Jute Mills is particularly interesting because of the authority on which it
relied. Beyond citing several cases mentioned in this Note as recognizing compulsory edu-
cation as a valid exercise of police power, the opinion by Justice Roesch cited on nearly
every page the New York Court of Appeals holding in People v. Lochner, 177 N.Y. 145, 69
N.E. 373 (1904), which upheld the validity of a New York law imposing limitations on
hours bakery employees could work. See Chelsea Jute Mills, 88 N.Y.S. at 1086-89. As of the
time of the opinion in Chelsea Jute Mills, Lochner was held up as a paragon of valid state
police power. See also Chelsea Jute Mills, 88 N.Y.S. at 1087. The next year, in one of its
most memorable decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Perhaps more memorable than the facts
of Lochner was the famous dissent of Justice Holmes:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not
entertain. If it were a question whether I agree with that theory, I should desire to
study it further and long before making up my mind .... The 14th Amendment does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
Id. at 75. Compare the Lochner dissent with that of Chief Justice Burger in Plyler. "Were it
our business to set the nation's social policy, I would agree without hesitation that it is
senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any children-including children of illegal
aliens-of an elementary education." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting). For an enlightening perspective on the import of the Holmes dissent, see RIcHARD
A. POSNER, LAw AND LrrERATURE 281-88 (1988). For a discussion of Chelsea Jute Mills, see
BENDER, supra note 64, at 82-84.
69 See KoriN & AnmAN, supra note 9, at 11 (discussing history of compulsory school
attendance in America); 2 JAMEs KENT. ComMENrARrEs ON AmERuCAN LAw 238 (1832) (O.W.
Holmes ed., 12th ed. 1873) (same).
70 KoTiN & AiMMAN, supra note 9, at 25.
71 See supra note 44 (listing compulsory school attendance statutes for 50 states, District
of Columbia and Puerto Rico).
72 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
73 See id. at 402 (discussing due process considerations). See generally EDWARDS, supra
note 8, at 17, 43 (discussing Meyer); Konri & AiKMAN, supra note 9, at 278-79 (same); SALo-
MONE, supra note 9, at 81 (same).
74 See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397.
75 See id. at 396.
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teaching of the English language, as well as the power to compel
school attendance.76 It held, however, that in its ban on teaching
foreign languages, the state had exceeded the authority of its po-
lice powers.7 7
Another Supreme Court case, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,78 de-
cided in 1925, involved a due process challenge to an Oregon com-
pulsory school attendance statute.79 The statute not only required
that each child between the ages of eight and sixteen years attend
school, but also that the child must attend an Oregon public
school.8 0 Parents failing to comply could be jailed for up to thirty
days and fined up to $100.81 The statute was challenged by two
private schools operating as corporations, a Catholic parochial
school and a military academy. 2 The Court in Pierce held that in
foreclosing the option of families to choose adequate private edu-
cation, the law violated their due process rights.8 3
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,"4 members of the Amish religion success-
fully challenged Wisconsin's compulsory education law which re-
quired all children to receive either public or private education un-
til the age of sixteen.8 5 According to the tenets of the Old Order
Amish community, the attendance of Amish children in high
school, public or private, was considered contrary to the Amish
way of life.8 6 The Court recognized that education in the Amish
lifestyle was inseparable from the exercise of the religion as a
76 Id. at 402. "The power of the state to compel attendance at some school and to make
reasonable regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they shall give instruc-
tions in English, is not questioned." Id.
77 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
78 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
79 See id. at 531-33. See generally BENDER, supra note 64, at 56-60 (discussing Pierce);
EDWARDS, supra note 8, at 18, 42 (same); HOGAN, supra note 8, at 135 (same); KoTrN &
AuCMAN, supra note 9, at 242-45, 250-56 (same); NoWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, §§ 14.26,
17.7 (same); SALOMONE, supra note 9, at 81 (same).
80 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530.
81 See id.
82 See id. at 531-33.
83 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). The Court in Pierce also held
that the due process rights of the school owners were violated. Id. at 535-36. The Court
conceded that the corporations could not claim the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 535. It held, however, that the business and property interests of the
corporations were entitled to equal protection. Id.
84 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
85 See id. at 207. See generally, HOGAN, supra note 8, at 135 (discussing Yoder); Korn &
AIMAN , supra note 9, at 245-54 (same); NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, §§ 17.6, 17.8
(same).
86 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 208-09.
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whole.87 The Court found further that education's goal of prepar-
ing a child for life was not compromised; conventional education
was adequately substituted by the vocational training received by
Amish children. 81 The Court thus limited Wisconsin's power to
compel the school attendance of ninth and tenth grade Amish
children. 9
Meyer, Pierce and Yoder imposed significant limitations on the
authority of the states to control their respective education pro-
grams. In each case, however, the Supreme Court expressly held
that the state's authority to compel the attendance of children in
some school, public or private, was valid.90
Supreme Court decisions addressing a "right" to an education
have mentioned compulsory education, although the nexus has
not been clearly defined.91 One of the most significant opinions in
American history, Brown v. Board of Education92 remarked upon
compulsory school attendance as being indicative of education's
importance to society.93 Later decisions have relied on Brown's
87 Id. at 218-19.
88 Id. at 235-36. In reaching its holding, the Court considered that the Amish had been
an identifiable religious sect for three centuries. Id. The Court drew a sharp distinction
between the established educational precepts of the Amish and "a group claiming to have
recently discovered some 'progressive' or enlightened process for rearing children for mod-
ern life." Id.
89 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 225 (1972).
90 Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) ("The power of the state to compel attend-
ance at some school . . . is not questioned."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925) ("No question is raised concerning the power of the State . . . to require that all
children of proper age attend some school . . . ."); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222 ("No one can
question the State's duty to protect children from ignorance . . ").
91 See, e.g., KoTiN & AIKMAN, supra note 9, at 241. The authors analyze cases involving
compulsory school attendance, and divide them into three categories: First, those cases
challenging the validity of compulsory attendance provisions per se; second, those cases
addressing a "right to an education;" and third, cases involving substantive rights of stu-
dents where the compulsory element of public school education is a factor. Id.
92 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (holding segregation in public schools violated Equal Pro-
tection Clause and expressly destroying doctrine of "separate but equal" formulated in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). For discussions of Brown and its impact, see
EDWARDS, supra note 8, at 548-49 (discussing impact of Brown); HOGAN, supra note 8, at 3-
4, 20-21, 29-31 (same); KoTN & AnoAAN, supra note 9, at 34, 260-62 (same); NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 5, §§ 12.2, 14.9, 15.2 (same); RICIARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 144-46, 302-309 (1990) (same); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE 354-56, 379 (1981) (same); SALoMONE, supra note 9, at 42-45, 56-58 (same); Peter
Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 604, 655 (1983) (same); Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv.
L. REV. 1065, 1129-29, 1133, 1137-39, 1150-54, 1184-1186 (1969) (same).
93 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic so-
ciety. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
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message, but the values the Brown Court attached to education,
while inspiring, lacked the force of law to permit later courts to
elevate education to the level of a fundamental right.94
The definitive case involving a right to education was San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,95 decided in
1973. Rodriguez involved a challenge to the Texas public school
financing scheme.96 The petitioners argued that the plan's inher-
ent inequalities based on distribution of wealth resulted in inequi-
table funding of school districts within the state.97 The Court in
Rodriguez found no constitutional basis, implicit or express, for
finding education to be a fundamental right.98
The Court in Rodriguez, as in its subsequent holding in Plyler,
may have stumbled by addressing the wrong issue. 99 The word
"right" appears nowhere in the Equal Protection Clause.100 As
Justice Rehnquist noted, the Equal Protection Clause does not
concern rights, but "protection of the laws."'01
Compulsory school attendance should be considered one such
protection of the laws. The state action compelling students to at-
tend school is the mechanism which raises education above the
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.
Id.
94 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding Texas' denial of access to
public schools by illegal aliens violated Fourteenth Amendment); San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding no fundamental right to
education).
95 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
9 Id. at 6.
97 Id. at 11-14.
98 Id. at 35; accord Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223 (following Rodriguez).
99 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 233 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("It is arguable,
of course, that the Court never should have applied fundamental rights doctrine in the
fashion [of Plyler].").
100 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1. Equal Protection Clause provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
101 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 180 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(holding failure to extend workmen's compensation benefits to illegitimate children of dece-
dent violated Equal Protection Clause).
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level of statutory entitlement to that of a "protection."'u 2 Compul-
sory school attendance not only protects children from ignorance,
it protects society as a whole from the hardship of caring for an
ever-expanding illiterate underclass. 10 3 Furthermore, protecting
the welfare of the whole of society justifies endowing a state with
police powers in the first place. 10 4 Rights and duties are not sy-
nonymous; 1° 5 parents have no more "right" to educate their chil-
dren than they have to pay taxes. Education of children is a legal
duty imposed upon parents by the state as parens patriae.0 6 Un-
like a right, a duty is not exercised by choice. 10 7
102 See MILL, supra note 17, at 271 (proposing that protection alone justifies governmen-
tal restriction of individual liberties).
103 Fogg v. Board of Educ., 82 Atl. 173, 175 (N.H. 1912) (upholding validity of compulsory
school attendance); see also MIL, supra note 17, at 271-72. Writing of restraining the indi-
vidual, Mill reasoned
[t]o justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to
produce evil to some one [sic] else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he
is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely con-
cerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body
and mind, the individual is sovereign.
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to
human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of
young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood.
Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected
against their own actions as well as against external injury.
Id. (emphasis added).
104 See Fogg, 82 Atl. at 175. Although not a duty imposed by its constitution, the state
assumes the duty to educate its children not only because of its public utility, but because
of the "great public necessity for the protection and welfare of the state itself." Id; see also
State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730, 732 (Ind. 1901). "Compulsory school attendance statutes have
been upheld not only as within the power of the legislature, but as necessary to carry out
the express purposes of the state constitution itself." Id; BENDER, supra note 64, at 84.
Bender confirms that the validity of compulsory school attendance laws has never been
successfully challenged. Id; EDWARDS, supra note 8, at 24. "The primary function of the
public school, in legal theory at least, is not to confer benefits upon the individual as such,
the school exists as a state institution because the very existence of civil society demands
it." Id. (citations omitted). Compulsory school attendance statutes do not exist to confer
benefits on either parents or children; rather, they provide what the "well-being and the
safety of the state requires." Id. (citations omitted); KOTIN & AnaM4A, supra note 9, at 84.
The authors posit that the concept of parental "rights" to education of children is absent in
compulsory attendance statutes due to the fact that the statutes are themselves "predi-
cated upon the public interest in the education of children." Id; MILL, supra note 17, at 271.
Each of the authorities above is consistent with Mill's concept of limiting individual liber-
ties only where demanded by the need to protect the public. Id.
105 See BLAck's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 53, at 1324. "Rights are defined generally as
'powers of free action. Id.; cf. BLACi's LAw DICTIONARY supra note 53, at 893. A legal duty
has been defined as: "An obligation recognized by law which requires an actor to conform to
a ,certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risk." Id.
(emphasis added).
106 See, e.g., BLAck's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 53, at 1114 (definingparens patriae as
government's care for those unable to care for themselves).
107 See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 53, at 893, 1324. This confusion of rights
and duties speaks to another criticism of equal protection analysis: the comparison of edu-
cation with rights such as voting. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 n.20 (1982). The
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If compulsory school attendance is a "protection of the laws,"
this fact alone is sufficient to engage the prohibitions on state ac-
tion found in the Equal Protection Clause. 0 8 The Equal Protec-
tion Clause itself does not suggest that a "protection" must attach
itself to a right.10 9 To whom the state must extend such protec-
tions is considered below.
III. ESTABLISHING PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
A. Is There An Affirmative Duty To Protect?
Whether the state is under an affirmative duty to provide bene-
fits, services, or protections is a fertile field of constitutional de-
bate. 110 Although scholars have labored to find such duties in the
Court addressed and disagreed with Texas' contention that since non-citizens could be de-
nied the franchise, denial of education was of less significance. Id. However, by even consid-
ering the two interests as comparable, the Court obscured a fundamental difference be-
tween the two-namely, that when one declines to exercise her right to vote, she faces no
legal sanction. Not so for withholding one's child from school. Furthermore, the Fourteenth
Amendment does not extend to non-citizens the privileges or immunities enjoyed by U.S.
citizens. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the denial of
equal protection of the laws. Id. But see Now~AK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 568. The
authors point out that "the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
has never been a meaningful vehicle for the judicial review of state actions ... ." Id.
The Court invoked voting in another unfortunate context in San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973). The Court in Rodriguez addressed the conten-
tion that education is inseparable from an informed electorate. See id. One might disagree
with the Court's declaration that the right to vote is not, per se, constitutionally protected.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude."); id. at amend. XVII [1] ("The Senate of the
United States shall be ... elected by the people thereof. .. ."); id. at amend. XIX [1] ("The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex."); id. at amend. XXIV § 1 ("The right of citizens of
the United States to vote in any ... election for President or Vice President ... Senator or
Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any
State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax."); id. at amend. XXVI § 1 ("The
right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age."). If not
absolute, the right to vote is certainly protected by a number of constitutional prohibitions.
See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647 (1964) ("The Equal Protection Clause
itself has been held to forbid some state laws that restrict the right to vote." (citations
omitted)).
108 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1 (prohibiting denial of "protection of the laws.").
109 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
110 See generally Betsy Levin, Education as a Constitutional Entitlement: A Proposed
Judicial Standard for Determining How Much is Enough, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 703 (sug-
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Constitution, the weight of authority holds that the Constitution
makes no such guarantees."' Furthermore, the courts have held
that even when a state undertakes to offer its protections to its
residents, negligent provision of those protections are not actiona-
ble as denials of due process or equal protection." 2 A common
thread runs through these cases in that the failure to protect
never coincided with a restriction of the individual's liberty. 13
Because this state coercion is the fulcrum of this Note's argument,
a closer examination of the cases may be in order.
When an automobile skidded off a road and caught fire, a Joliet,
Illinois policeman arriving on the scene two minutes later began
directing traffic around the burning car." 4 Although the car's
lights were on and the car's wheels were still spinning, 115 the of-
ficer made no attempt to determine if anyone was still inside. 116
gesting courts can recognize states' duties to provide education without legislating as to
qualitative levels of education provided); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969) (speculating that
rights to satisfaction of basic needs may be found in Constitution); Frank I. Michelman,
Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659 (arguing existence
of welfare rights within Constitution). But see David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Con-
stitutional Rights, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 864 (1986) (concluding that government restrictions
articulated in Bill of Rights do not necessarily create positive rights to government entitle-
ments); Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution,
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695 (disputing Professor Michelman's position of Constitution-based
welfare rights).
111 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)
( [T]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental
aid.... ."); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 1988) ("How could there be
a 'duty to rescue' in a Constitution that does not require the government to educate or
provide minimal social welfare services for its residents?"); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715
F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983) ("It is enough to note that, as currently understood, the
concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include a right to basic services,
whether competently provided or otherwise.").
112 See, e.g., Bowers v. De Vito, 686 F.2d 616, 617 (7th Cir. 1982). In Bowers, a man
released from an Illinois mental hospital five years after killing a young woman with a
knife, murdered Marguerite Anne Bowers a year after his release. Id. The estate of Bowers
brought a civil rights action under U.S.C. § 1983. Id. After determining that it was not the
state which placed Bowers in a position of danger, the court held, "the only duties of care
that may be enforced in suits under section 1983 are duties founded on the Constitution or
laws of the United States; and the duty to protect the public from dangerous madmen is not
among them." Id. at 619. See also Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1205. "If the defendants deprived
the plaintiffs' decedents of anything it was of some right to competent rescue services. But,
as we have been at pains to stress, there is no such right in the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id.
113 Which is not to say the victims in these cases are anything but sympathetic. See
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192 (four-year-old boy beaten into a coma by his father); Archie, 847
F.2d at 1213-14 (woman killed by easily treatable bronchial attack); Jackson, 715 F.2d at
1201 (teenaged boy and pregnant teenaged girl burned to death in car accident).




The parents of the seventeen-year-old boy and the sixteen-year-
old pregnant girl who were killed in the accident brought a civil
rights action in Jackson v. City of Joliet."7 The claim alleged that
but for the negligence of Joliet's police and fire departments, the
victims would have been saved. 1 8 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held that a botched attempt at res-
cue by a state official did not give rise to an action for denial of
Fourteenth Amendment rights." 9 Noting that the Constitution is
a charter of negative rather than positive liberties, 2 ° Judge Rich-
ard Posner, writing for the court, reasoned that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not include any right to competently provided
basic services. 121
Archie v. City of Racine,122 also a Seventh Circuit case, involved
a similar challenge based on the failure of a fire department dis-
patcher to send help to a victim of a bronchial attack.'23 Like
Jackson, the court in Archie failed to find an affirmative duty on
the part of the state to provide services to an individual. 124 In
dicta, however, the court noted the significance of the "role of the
state as the initiator."125 The court argued that by "stripp[ing]
away avenues of self-help," the state could be found to create its
own affirmative obligations. 126
117 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983).
118 Id. at 1202.
119 Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1205.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1203 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980); Bowers v. DeVito, 686
F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)); Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1203-04. Judge Posner cites Rodriguez
as supporting this proposition. Id. Rejecting the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees "the provision of basic services," Judge Posner lumps together "education, poor
relief and [ I police protection." Id. at 1203.
If these three examples were to be considered "entitlements," such an interpretation
would not be inconsistent with one premise of this note-that entitlements need not be
granted to everyone. Judge Posner's three examples, however, are themselves sufficiently
inconsonant to suggest an alternative position as advanced by this Note. Education (in the
form of compulsory primary and secondary school attendance) is admittedly not a right; it
is a legal duty imposing a burden of penal sanction for non-compliance. This Note argues
that it is the protection afforded by this duty that may not be denied by the state within the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
122 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
123 Id. at 1213-14.
124 Id. at 1220.
125 Id. at 1222. The Court employed this concept in the context of criminal cases, or as in
the case of a state holding a legal monopoly on a certain activity such as divorce. Id. The
construct suggested by this Note looks to this same role, albeit in a somewhat different
light.
126 Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1222 (1988).
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In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services,127
the United States Supreme Court also rejected the argument that
the Constitution creates affirmative duties upon the state to offer
competent protections. 128  In that case, four-year-old Joshua
DeShaney was beaten into a coma by his father and suffered irre-
versible brain damage. 2 ' County authorities were aware of the
elder DeShaney's violent propensities, but failed to remove Joshua
from his father's custody. 130 The Court's holding in DeShaney dis-
tilled the essence of an affirmative duty of the state. The Court
based the creation of a state duty on the state's affirmative act of
restraining the individual's freedom.' 3 1 The "deprivation of lib-
erty," rather than a passive failure to act, is the mechanism that
triggers constitutional protections. 132
The rationale of DeShaney was based in large part on two ear-
lier landmark Supreme Court cases: Estelle v. Gamble 33 and
Youngberg v. Romeo.'1 4 In both cases, the common denominator
was a custodial relationship between the state and the plain-
tiffs. 135 In each case, the Court imposed on the states a duty of
127 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
128 Id. at 196-98.
129 See id. at 192-93.
130 See id. at 192.
131 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining
the individual' freedom to act on his own behalf, through incarceration, institutional-
ization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty, which is the "deprivation of lib-
erty" triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to pro-
tect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means.
Id.
132 See Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs, 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
133 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
134 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
135 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98. Gamble was a prisoner in the Texas penal system. Id.
After he was injured in a prison work-related accident, Gamble was treated by a doctor and
given pain medication for his injury. Id. at 99-100. Prison authorities insisted that Gamble
return to work; when he complained that he could not, he was placed in solitary confine-
ment. Id. at 101. Four days later, after complaining of chest pains and "blank outs," Gam-
ble was examined by a medical assistant and hospitalized. Id. at 101. The Court held that
prison authorities acted with "deliberate indifference to [Gamble's] serious medical needs
in violation of his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id.
at 104-05.
See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. Nicholas Romeo was a profoundly retarded 33 year-old
man with an I.Q. of between 8 and 10. Id. at 309. In accordance with a Pennsylvania stat-
ute, Romeo was involuntarily committed to a state mental hospital facility. Id. at 310. Dur-
ing his stay at the facility, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions, both by his own
violence, and by that of other hospital residents. Id. While being treated for a broken arm,
Romeo was restrained for his own protection and for that of other patients in traction and
undergoing intravenous treatment. Id. Part of Romeo's complaint alleged that his restraint
was excessive. Id. The Court in Youngberg held, as the State conceded, that the State owed
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care based on the custodial relationship between the state and the
plaintiff. Cases since DeShaney involving the public schools have
been decided in the Circuit Courts of Appeals with mixed re-
sults. 136 Some cases have held that the compulsory element of the
public school environment created the type of special relationship
contemplated by DeShaney;13 7 other cases failed to find such a re-
lationship. 13  In considering whether the state action was estab-
lished, the cases focused on the presence of a custodial-type rela-
tionship. 3 9 Custody, however, flows from the state's authority to
restrict the individual's liberty in the first instance. This Note
urges that by exercising this power to coerce behavior, the state
creates a "protection of the laws."
B. What Does The Equal Protection Clause Prohibit?
Statutes enacted by state legislatures carry with them a pre-
sumption of constitutionality. 4 ' When legislation is challenged
under the Equal Protection Clause, the state need only show that
a duty to provide adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care to Romeo. Id. at 324; see
also NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 500 n.18 (discussing Youngberg, Estelle, and role
of custody in due process consideration).
136 See, e.g., Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding compulsory
school attendance law did not give rise to due process claim); D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks
Area Vo. Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3d Cir. 1992) (same); J.O. v. Alton Community
Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267,273 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist.,
975 F.2d 137, 149 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that compulsory attendance statute created an
affirmative duty of protection); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 723 (3d
Cir. 1989)(noting that finding of sufficient affirmative state action in form of compulsory
school attendance statute to establish duty of care would not be inconsistent with
DeShaney).
137 See, e.g., Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 731 (holding compulsory school attendance law did
not give rise to due process claim); Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1376 (same); Alton, 909 F.2d
at 273 (same).
138 See Taylor, 975 F.2d at 149 (finding that compulsory attendance statute created an
affirmative duty of protection); Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 723 (noting that finding of sufficient
affirmative state action in form of compulsory school attendance statute to establish duty of
care would not be inconsistent with DeShaney).
139 See, e.g., Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 731 (holding compulsory school attendance law did
not give rise to due process claim); Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1376 (same); Alton, 909 F.2d
at 273 (same); Taylor, 975 F.2d at 149 (finding that compulsory attendance statute created
an affirmative duty of protection); Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 723 (noting that finding of suffi-
cient affirmative state action in form of compulsory school attendance statute to establish
duty of care would not be inconsistent with DeShaney).
140 E.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (holding city ordinance
eliminating all but two pushcart food vendors from French Quarter of New Orleans did not
violate Equal Protection Clause); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 47
(1973) (upholding Texas school district financing scheme as not violative of equal protec-
tion); United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (holding ban on inter-
state shipment of filled milk to be permissible exercise of Congressional commerce power
and not violative of equal protection).
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the statute bear a "rational relation" to a "legitimate government
interest" in order to sustain the presumption."' If, however, the
law as enacted appears to encroach upon a "fundamental right,
1 42
the courts will examine the statute with a heightened level of re-
view known as "strict scrutiny." 14 3 Likewise, if the statute pro-
vides for disparate treatment of an identifiable class of individuals
the court considers "suspect,"1 44 the courts will treat such classifi-
cations as "presumptively invidious"' 45 and will also apply the
more stringent strict scrutiny test.
46
The following proposal suggests a means of discerning which
governmental benefits or services are "protections" from statutory
entitlements which exist by grace of the legislature.
Consistent with DeShaney, where affirmative state action co-
erces individual behavior in exercising its power to protect society
as a whole, such action would constitute a "protection of the
141 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (declaring invalid Virgina anti-miscege-
nation statute); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (holding Oregon stat-
ute requiring compulsory school attendance exclusively at public schools violated due pro-
cess); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (invalidating as
arbitrary Virginia law taxing local corporations at different rate than foreign corporations
doing business within state); see also NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.3 (explaining
rational relation test).
142 See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972), which held that failure
to extend workmen's compensation benefits to illegitimate children of decedent violated
Equal Protection Clause. But see id. at 179 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
sharply criticized the Court's use of the fundamental right standard, calling it "a judicial
superstructure, awkwardly engrafted upon the Constitution itself." Id. He also found the
fundamental rights doctrine to be "devoid... of any historical or textual support in the
language of the Equal Protection Clause .... " Id. See generally NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 5, § 14.3 (discussing fundamental rights considerations).
143 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971) (holding Arizona plan to deny
welfare benefits to resident aliens preempted by federal law); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 660 (1969) (recognizing fundamental right to travel); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 504 (1965) (recognizing fundamental right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (reversing Oklahoma Supreme Court, which
ordered sterilization of "habitual criminals" convicted of two or more "felonies involving
moral turpitude). See generally NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.3 (discussing strict
scrutiny considerations).
144 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. The Court in Rodriguez, noting that the plaintiffs
could not be recognized as a "suspect class," relied on the "traditional indicia of suspect-
ness." Id. The Court listed as indicia: being saddled with disabilities, subjected to a history
of purposeful inequal treatment or relegated to a position of political powerlessness so as to
require extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. Id. But see Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), which upheld the validity of Japanese
internment during World War II.
145 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (holding illegal aliens not suspect class,
education not fundamental right, therefore, strict scrutiny was inappropriate).
146 See id. (declining to employ strict scrutiny, but rather applying an "intermediate"
level of scrutiny).
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laws."147 Hypothetically, a state might declare that every child
under three years of age riding in a car must ride in a special child
safety seat. The child is thus benefited by the protection of the
law restricting the parent's freedom to drive without the safety
seat.
In another example, a state could declare that, to protect the
public health, all apartment buildings of six or more units must be
cleared of asbestos without charge to the tenants. The tenants of
the apartment buildings would benefit from the protection of the
law resulting from the state action compelling the landlord to re-
move the asbestos.
In both of these examples, the benefit to the individual results
from affirmative state action restricting a "liberty." In neither
case must the recipient meet any statutory eligibility requirement
to receive the benefit. These benefits may fairly be labeled
"active."
Compare these examples with a hypothetical food stamps pro-
gram. Under the rules of the program, any person meeting the
statutorily defined eligibility requirements may receive food
stamps. An eligible individual may elect not to receive the benefit
of the program; doing so would result in no legal sanction.
Analogous to food stamps would be a state-supported law
school. Presumably, the school and the state would be unable to
offer such a "benefit" to all potential takers. Eligibility require-
ments could be based on any number of qualitative as well as
quantitative factors. As with food stamps, even those eligible to
enroll in the law school would be under no duty to do so. These
benefits may be called "passive."'4 8
147 See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202. The Court in Plyler, citing Rodriguez, allowed that
education was not a fundamental right, but declared it neither "some governmental 'bene-
fit' indistinguishable from other forms of social legislation." Id. at 221. The Court then
offered a number of amorphous concepts of civic virtue to support its position. Id. The dis-
sent, seizing upon this "opaque observation," said that the Court's opinion was unclear. Id.
at 247 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "Is the Court," asked the dissent, "suggesting that educa-
tion is more 'fundamental' than food, shelter, or medical care?" Id. at 248. Of particular
concern to the dissent appeared to be the fact that the Court provided no mechanism for
determining how education could be distinguished from other "governmental benefits." Id.
at 247 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
148 See, e.g., Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). Matthews involved a challenge by
three Cuban resident aliens to a denial of medicaid benefits. Id. at 69-70. Although resident
aliens were eligible for the benefits, § 1831 et seq. of the Social Security Act of 1935 re-
quired that resident aliens had been admitted for permanent residence and had lived in the
U.S. for five years. Id. at 70. The Court, in denying the aliens' claim, reasoned that because
Congress had no constitutional duty to provide all aliens with the welfare benefits provided
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In neither the passive nor active benefit examples above may
the state decline to extend the benefits to anyone on discrimina-
tory bases such as race or religion. But, unlike the passive benefit
that may be received only upon a demonstration of eligibility, the
active benefit, manufactured solely through the force of law, can-
not be denied to anyone.
This model does not suggest that entitlements are not worthy of
government protection. As noted above, the right to vote is se-
cured by the Constitution. 149 Yet, state restrictions on voter eligi-
bility are valid.' 50 Under the model urged by this Note, the laws
against discrimination in voting would qualify as protections. The
vote itself, however, would nonetheless be an entitlement.
C. Illegal Aliens Too?
The term "any person," as found in the Equal Protection Clause,
is not limited to United States citizens. '51 The Supreme Court has
to citizens, the Congressional line drawing was not unreasonable. Id. at 82-83. The Court,
however, also noted that even an alien in the United States unlawfully was still entitled to
the protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 77.
149 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude."); id. at amend. XVII [1] ("The Senate of the United States
shall be... elected by the people thereof.. . ."); id. at amend. XIX [1] ("The right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of sex."); id. at amend. XXIV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United
States to vote in any .. . election for President or Vice President... Senator or Representa-
tive in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by
reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax."); id. at amend. XXVI, § 1 ("The right of
citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.").
150 See, e.g., N.Y. ELEc. LAw § 5-106 (Consol. 1996) (denying eligibility to vote to con-
victed felons).
151 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 102 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding enforcement of San Fran-
cisco ordinance discriminated against Chinese laundry owners in violation of Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1982) (holding denial of access to
free public education to children of illegal aliens unconstitutional); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (invalidating as violative of Equal Protection Clause Arizona law
conditioning eligibility for welfare benefits on United States citizenship or residence for
fifteen years); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (declaring inva-
lid California statute restricting commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible for citi-
zenship); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915) (invalidating Arizona statute forcing em-
ployers to hire required number of qualified voters or native born citizens); Wong Wing v.
United States, 112 U.S. 228, 242-43 (1896) (invalidating sentence of Chinese alien to hard
labor without judicial trial).
Yick Wo remains the standard for defining impermissible discriminatory application in
the enforcement of a law under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 357 (1886). Yick Wo involved a San Francisco ordinance prohibiting wooden
buildings to be used as laundries. Id. at 357. At that time there were approximately 320
laundries in San Francisco, all but 10 in wooden buildings. Id. at 359. Of the total number
of laundries, about 240 were owned and operated by Chinese immigrants. Id. at 358-59.
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reviewed the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment
and established conclusively that "any person" means just that. 152
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to protect freed slaves,
not then citizens, from oppressive legislation by the states. 15 3 The
seemingly ambiguous term "persons" was a deliberate attempt by
the amendment's framers to include not only freed slaves, but any
other non-citizens as well.15 4 A number of cases have recognized
aliens as persons within the meaning of the Amendment. 155
The 80 or so non-Chinese-owned laundries were given exemptions from the ordinance. Id.
None of the more than 200 Chinese laundry owners was given an exemption. Id. The Court
held that the discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance was a denial of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and therefore invalid. Id. at 374.
152 See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210-215. In reviewing the Fourteenth Amendment's leg-
islative history, the Court in Plyler considered debate from the draft resolution of the Joint
Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction in which was to become the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id. at 214-15. Senator Howard, Floor Manager of the Bill in the Senate spoke of the
Amendment's deliberate meaning to encompass not only citizens, but all persons within its
protection. Id. at 215.
The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State from depriv-
ing not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever he may be, of life
liberty, or property without due process of law, or from denying to him the equal pro-
tection of the laws of the State. This abolishes all class legislation in the States and
does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable
to another.... It will, if adopted by the States, forever disable every one of them from
passing laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to
citizens of the United States, and to all persons who happen to be within their
jurisdiction.
Id. (emphasis supplied by the Court)
153 See Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983), where Judge Posner
explains the history of the Fourteenth Amendment; see also Westen, supra note 92, at 626
n.38. One of Professor Westen's articles on the meaning of equality yields some disillusion-
ing nuggets of history. In revisiting the Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858, Professor Westen
reveals that Abraham Lincoln, the Great Emancipator, was rather emphatically against
negro citizenship.
I am not in favor of negro citizenship.... Now my opinion is that the different states
have the power to make a negro a citizen under the Constitution of the United States if
they choose. The Dred Scott decision decides that they have not that power. If the
State of Illinois had that power I should be opposed to the exercise of it. That is all I
have to say about it.
Id. (quoting Speech of Abraham Lincoln at Charleston, Sept. 18, 1858, in POLITICAL DE-
BATES BETWEEN HON. ABRAHAM LImcoLN AND HON. STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 156 (1860)).
Lincoln's misgivings appear to have run deeper than mere extension of citizenship. "I am
not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any way social and political equality
of the white and black races-that I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters
... of Negroes ... ." Westen, supra note 92, at 626 n.38 (quoting Speech of Abraham
Lincoln at Charleston, Sept. 18, 1858, in POLrrIcAL DEBATES BETWEEN HON. ABRAHAM LIN-
COLN AND HON. STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 136 (1860)).
154 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210-15 (discussing history of Fourteenth Amendment); Jack-
son, 715 F.2d at 1204 (same); Westen, supra note 92, at 626 (same).
155 See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1948) (declaring
invalid California statute restricting commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible for
citizenship); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (invalidating sentence
of Chinese alien to hard labor without judicial trial); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369 (holding
discriminatory enforcement of San Francisco ordinance prohibiting wooden laundries vio-
lated Equal Protection Clause).
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Although the question of equal protection and illegal aliens had
never been addressed by the Court, 156 Plyler v. Doe specifically
recognized that whatever his immigration status, an alien is enti-
tled to equal protection of the laws. 1
57
D. Plyler v. Doe
In 1975, Texas passed a law designed to relieve the state of its
costs to educate the children of illegal aliens residing in Texas.'5
A class action challenge to the statute resulted in the 1982
landmark Supreme Court decision, Plyler v. Doe.1 59 In its 5-4 deci-
sion, the Court held that denying children of illegal aliens free
public education violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 60
Using traditional equal protection analysis, the Court consid-
ered whether the statute targeted a potentially suspect class. 16
156 See NowAK & RoTUNDA, supra note 5, §14.3 (noting the scope of Equal Protection
Clause extended for first time to give unlawfully resident aliens limited protection).
157 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) ("Whatever his status under the immigration
laws, an alien is surely a "person" in any ordinary sense of that term.").
158 Id. at 205 n.1 (1982). The Texas legislature revised the state education code to with-
hold funds from school districts for the education of illegal aliens. Id. (citing TEx. EDuc.
CODE. ANN. §21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1981). Although Texas enacted §21.031 in 1975, the
Tyler Independent School District continued to enroll undocumented children until the
1977-78 school year. Id. at 206 n.2. In July of 1977, the School District adopted a policy
allowing undocumented children to enroll in school upon payment of a "full tuition fee." Id.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas issued a preliminary
injunction in response to a class action brought by a group of children excluded by the
School District from enrolling in school. Id. at 206. The District Court below held that the
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; Doe v.
Plyler, 458 F.Supp. 569, 585 (E.D. Tex. 1978). The District Court also held that the statute
was invalid as pre-empting federal law. Id. at 592. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit ruled that the District Court below erred in finding the statute pre-empted. Id.; Plyler
v. Doe, 628 F.2d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 1980). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, the
lower court's finding of unconstitutionality based on violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 461.
See also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 209-10. Other similar challenges to the statute filed in other
District Courts in Texas were ultimately consolidated by the Supreme Court. Id.
159 457 U.S. at 202. For comprehensive analyses of the Plyler decision, see generally
Elizabeth Hull, Undocumented Alien Children and Free Public Education: An Analysis of
Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 409 (1983) (discussing impact and rationale of Plyler
decision); Lichtenberg, supra note 18, at 351 (same); Tom Gerety, Children in the Laby-
rinth: The Complexities of Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 379 (1983) (same); Perry, supra
note 51, at 329 (same).
160 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. The Court held that the State failed to demonstrate that the
denial of access to public education to the children of illegal aliens furthered some substan-
tial state interest. Id. The substantial interest consideration was pegged to the intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny the Court afforded the Texas statute. Id. at 217-18 n.16.
161 Id. at 219 n.19. "We reject the claim that 'illegal aliens' are a 'suspect class."' Id.; see
also Lichtenberg, supra note 18, at 351 (discussing Court's consideration of suspect classifi-
cation in Plyler).
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The Court held that illegal aliens were not a suspect class, reason-
ing that the illegal alien's status was the result of his own volun-
tary action, and as such did not rise to the level of the "traditional
indicia of suspectness" based on a person's immutable
characteristics. 16
2
The Rodriguez decision nine years earlier rejected education as
a fundamental right, foreclosing the possibility of strict scrutiny
evaluation in Plyler. 163 With both conventional means of justifying
strict scrutiny of the statute closed, the default standard of review
should have been the rational basis test.164 The Court, however,
considered education an interest too important to be left to the
less exacting rational basis standard.'65 Basing its ability to do so
on several fairly recent cases, 166 the Court fashioned an interme-
162 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1982). The Court allowed that the arguments for
denying the state's bounty to aliens unlawfully present lacked force when applied to the
aliens' children. Id. The Court seemingly undermined its rationale of "voluntary action" as
basis for denial of "suspect" classification. Id. at 220. Noting that while their parents could
conform to the immigration laws, the children plaintiffs "[could] affect neither their par-
ents' conduct nor their own status." Id. at 220 (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770
(1977)). The Court also raised questions of the ethics of "imposing [a] discriminatory bur-
den on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have little control." Id. at
220. "Visiting . . . condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust ...
[Plenalizing the.., child is an ineffectual, as well as unjust, way of deterring the parent."
Id. at 220 (citing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
163 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973) (holding no fun-
damental right to education); see also supra note 100 and accompanying text.
164 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. The Court noted that in most applications of equal protec-
tion analysis, the Court sought only a "fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose." Id.
The District Court below felt that the statute failed to meet even this lowest standard of
review. See Doe v. Plyler, 458 F.Supp. 569, 585 (E.D. Tex. 1978); accord Plyler v. Doe, 628
F.2d 448, 458 (5th Cir. 1980). "Charging tuition to undocumented children constitutes a
ludicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal immigration .... " Plyler, 458
F.Supp. at 585.
See also Lichtenberg, supra note 18, at 351-363, 371-374. Professor Lichtenberg consid-
ers the viability of the rationality standard and ultimately takes the position that the ra-
tionality test was an unsatisfactory method of analysis for the issues presented in Plyler.
Id. at 372; Gerety, supra note 159, at 387-392 (discussing efficacy of rationality in equal
protection analysis); Perry, supra note 159, at 339 (outlining arguments against Court's
rationale in Plyler).
165 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-18. The Court explained that where fundamental rights or
suspect classifications were involved, equal protection analysis required that the chal-
lenged legislation be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." Id. at
216-217. The Court then noted that on occasion, legislation, "without being facially invidi-
ous-as with suspect classes or fundamental rights" [gave] rise to recurring constitutional
difficulties." Id. at 217. In those "limited circumstances," a five-justice majority of the Court
felt that such legislation required that the legislation would call for an "intermediate" level
of scrutiny. Id. at 217-18.
166 Id. at 218 n.16. The Court cited its own holdings in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) (applying intermediate level of scrutiny to classifications based on gender); Lalli v.
Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275 (1978) (applying intermediate level of scrutiny to classifications of
illegitimacy); University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (upholding
ability of state to consider race of applicants in affirmative action program for admission to
166 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:137
diate standard of review, less stringent than strict scrutiny, more
stringent than the rational basis test.167 Inasmuch as the dual-
level test had been criticized in 1966 by Justice Harlan in Katzen-
bach v. Morgan,68 creating additional layers of analysis was sure
to evoke controversy. 1
6 9
The dissent in Plyler, led by Chief Justice Burger, 170 called the
deprivation of education to any children-including illegal
aliens-"senseless." 171 Nevertheless the dissenters found no legit-
imate authority for the Court to substitute its judgment for that of
the Texas legislature. 172 Although the Chief Justice's distaste for
the statute in Plyler was evident,' 73 he questioned the Court's
state university medical school); see also SALOMONE, supra note 9, at 117 (discussing impact
of Craig in context of education).
167 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.16 (1982) ("This technique of 'intermediate' scru-
tiny permits us to evaluate the rationality of the legislative judgment with reference to
well-settled constitutional principles.").
168 384 U.S. 641, 661 (1966)(Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan discounted the au-
thority of the Court to apply a stricter level of scrutiny where fundamental rights were
involved, saying "no such dual-level test has ever been articulated by this Court, and I do
not believe that any such approach is consistent with the purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. But see, San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall would have carried the notion of variable scrutiny further
still, suggesting a continuum approach to review. Id. He noted that the Court seemed to
have consistently adjusted its scrutiny with regard to the particular interest affected by the
invidiousness of a particular classification. Id.
169 See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent in Plyler felt
that by raising and lowering the degree of scrutiny afforded to a legislation based on the
interest affected, the Court assumed a legislative function for which it "lacked competence."
Id. (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 31).
170 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice was joined in the
dissent by Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Connor. Id. The significance of the dissent's
core is not lost on pundits today. See, e.g., Paul Feldman, Major Portions of Prop. 187
Thrown Out by Federal Judge, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1995, at Al (reporting contention of
Proposition 187 supporters that review by present Court, with its conservative makeup,
could produce different result today).
Such predictions may expect too much from ideology. First, 'the Court, given the opportu-
nity to overturn its most controversial decision of the past thirty years, elected not to do so.
The Court, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
870 (1992), expressly reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) in large measure be-
cause of the Court's respect for stare decisis. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 853.
Second, the dissent in Plyler, appeared not to base its disagreement with the Court on the
moral support for the Court's holding; rather, its criticism focused on the method of analy-
sis used by the Court in arriving at its result. See also Perry, supra note 159, at 341-42.
Professor Perry agrees that the posture of the dissent is revealed in the opening lines of
dissenting opinion. Id. Third, it is submitted that any suggestion that Plyler is vulnerable
due to the ideological makeup of the current Court misses the mark; even a sympathetic
supporter of Plyler's result could rightly criticize Plyler based on nothing more than the
tenuous foundation on which the intermediate standard of review was based.
171 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing motivation of statute).
172 Id. at 243. The Chief Justice criticized the activist stance of the Court in attempting
to fashion remedies for the failures of the political processes. Id.
173 See id. at 252. "Denying a free education to illegal alien children is not a choice I
would make were I a legislator." Id.
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ability to determine which benefits were entitled to priority classi-
fication and suggested that the problem was settled best through
the political process.' 74
IV. ANOTHER STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR PROPOSITION 187
Using the "protection of the laws" as a yardstick suggests differ-
ent determinations of constitutionality for the various measures of
the initiative.
Primary and secondary education would fall squarely into the
scope of the protection of the laws category. Because the "benefit"
is the precipitate of liberty-restricting state action, 1 75 such a bene-
fit should not, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, be de-
nied to any person.176
Similarly, the measures restricting access to non-emergency
medical care to illegal alien children would appear to offend the
Fourteenth Amendment. If child welfare laws impose duties on
parents to secure adequate food, shelter and medical attention for
their children,177 to deny these children the "benefit" of the laws
undermines the power of the Constitution.
Adults affected by Proposition 187 would meet with a different
outcome. The state imposes no duty upon any adult-citizen or
not-to seek post-secondary education for herself. Neither are
adults under any state compulsion to receive medical attention for
themselves. Unlike their children, the undocumented adult alien
can leave the United States by himself. If a nineteen year-old un-
documented alien wants to attend college, he can return to his na-
tive country. Because the benefits extended to the adult alien are
not the result of the type of liberty-restricting state action out-
lined above, they do not rise to the level of "protection," and there-
fore would fall into the category of entitlement.
174 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 253 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
175 See supra note 70 (listing compulsory school attendance statutes of all fifty states,
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico).
176 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (prohibiting denial of equal protection of the laws).
177 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988). In California, "[i]f a parent of a minor
child willfully omits, without lawful excuse to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or
medical attendance... for his or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor" and may
be fined up to $2000 or imprisoned in a county jail for up to one year or both. Id. If a parent
fails to provide the above mentioned necessities after an adjudication in civil or criminal
court, the parent may be sentenced to a "determinate term of one year and one day" in a
state prison. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Compulsory school attendance is a protection of the laws. Un-
documented aliens are persons within the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the de-
nial of the equal protection of the laws to any person. Therefore,
denying the children of illegal aliens the protection of compulsory
school attendance laws appears to violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The model suggested by this Note ignores the ethical and moral
dimensions of denying government benefits on the basis of a per-
son's immigration status. What cannot be ignored is that a fimda-
mental difference exists between providing a benefit and compel-
ling someone to accept it. When the government uses the power of
law to force people to act in a certain way for the protection of
others, the result of this power should be recognized as a protec-
tion of the law. By using this idea as a starting point, future
courts would be able to avoid the sort of value judgments spurned
by Holmes over ninety years ago in Lochner.
John R. Bunker
